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Whose Environmental Justice?  Social 
Identity and Institutional Rationality 
The recent decision in Alexander v. Sandoval1 has seriously 
limited the available opportunities for minorities to argue their claims 
for environmental justice.  Prior to Sandoval, plaintiffs alleging 
disparate impact as a result of the policies implemented by a federally 
funded agency met with moderate success under Title VI section 
602.2  After Sandoval, however, the chances of success in private 
litigations for the aggrieved communities look decidedly bleak.  
Although the Court in Sandoval admitted a private right of action 
under Title VI section 601,3 it interpreted section 601 to depend upon 
a showing of intentional discrimination.  This restriction poses 
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1 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).  A deeply divided Supreme Court held 
that no private right of action exists to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
section 602.  Section 602 provides that: “Each Federal department and agency which is 
empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is 
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title . . . by 
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability . . . .” 
2 See, e.g., Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3rd 
Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 974 (1998). 
3 Section 601 of Title VI  provides that: “No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.” 
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insurmountable evidentiary burdens for plaintiffs.4  Furthermore, the 
opportunity for plaintiffs to avail themselves of the “backdoor” of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983,5 as suggested by Justice Stevens in his dissent in 
Sandoval, remains unclear.  In respect to claims of environmental 
discrimination, the circuit courts have held that the administrative 
regulations implemented through Title VI do not create an 
enforceable interest under section 1983.6  In a post-Sandoval context, 
minorities discriminated against have lost significant legal leverage in 
using courts to redress the discrimination.  The responsibility for 
enforcing environmental compliance under Title VI now rests almost 
entirely with the agencies themselves.7
In the wake of Sandoval, the reliance on administrative relief and 
the Court’s tendency towards “implicit legislation,” may move 
modern regulation away from the types of goals that communities and 
their resident groups might seek on their own or demand from their 
political allies.  Arguments and legislative debates surrounding a 
contested social practice illustrate that marginalized social groups are 
often faced with a seemingly impossible choice, especially when the 
state is divided against itself.8  If they are to pursue their claims 
successfully, these plaintiffs are required to frame their arguments in 
accord with the dominant themes of the cultural myths that define the 
                                                                    
4 See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
te, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
6
n administrative regulation cannot create an interest enforceable under section 
S. C  Cir. 2001).  See 
ssibilities in Title VI 
En
TED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 
IN 
5 Section 1983 provides in relevant part that: 
Every person who, under color of any statu
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
 
[A]
1983 unless the interest already is implicit in the statute authorizing the 
regulation, and that inasmuch as Title VI proscribes only intentional 
discrimination, the plaintiffs do not have a right enforceable through a 1983 
action under the EPA’s disparate impact discrimination regulations. 
amden Citizens v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d
also Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003). 
7 Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Po
forcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1774 (2003). 
8 See THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNI
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 253-59 (1995) (discussing the development of several 
policies targeting the poor which eventually impacted negatively the very categories those 
policies were supposed to protect). 
 






moment at hand.  This requires them to draw heavily upon scientific, 
economic, and political resources that are traditionally beyond their 
reach.9  This search for common ground from which to launch a 
credible response to the challenge of balancing incommensurable 
ends10 often results in these plaintiffs coming to adopt the very 
conclusions they originally sought to oppose.  At the end of the day, 
minority plaintiffs are bound to discover that they have surrendered 
all vestiges of the once distinctive voice which had marked them as an 
identifiable social group.11  If administrative agencies remain the sole 
enforcers of environmental compliance, it is imperative that they 
develop policies more sensitive to the specific needs and distincti
ices which give identity to the environmental justice movement. 
The assumption that the environmental justice movement has 
always had a distinct identity outside the context of struggle within 
the legal system is wrong.  The identity of this movement emerged 
gradually through interaction with the actors that contested it, such as 
the courts, the administrative agencies and the agents of harm.  This 
identity was shaped most obviously in the strategic negotiation of 
claims about the basis for identity as an aggrieved class.  It is 
important to understand the ways in which the identity of this 
movement has been expressed and transformed by its expression 
within the administrative machinery of formal legal proceedings.  The 
identity of the plaintiffs in these cases has been shaped by the 
requirements of the adversarial legal process.  This process be
d ends at the local level with an assertion of community status. 
This Article analyzes the arguments and evidentiary claims that 
have characterized three high profile cases in which plaintiffs asserted 
that decisions made by government agencies have been marked by 
racial definitions.  The purpose of this Article is twofold.  First, the 
Article investigates how plaintiffs resolve the tension between their 
desire to achieve justice under the rules governing legal discourse and 
their need to preserve the social identity of their community.  Second, 
                                                                    
9 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Manners of Imagining the Real, 19 LAW & SOC. 
IN
USTICE 70 (1997). 
orical 
Co
QUIRY 995 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of proving violence against women when 
the claims are formulated in a counter-dominant cultural frame). 
10 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL J
11 M. Linda Miller, Public Argument and Legislative Debate in the Rhet
nstruction of Public Policy: The Case of Florida Midwifery Legislation, 85 Q.J. SPEECH 
361, 372-73 (1999) (showing how the attempt of Florida midwives to engage the 
testimony of their opponents medicalized their discourse; consequently, pro-midwifery 
legislation later passed fostered the assimilation of lay midwifery into nurse midwifery). 
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ntific, and ethical), it is possible to 
ex
ric can overcome 
traditional distinctions based on race while furthering the relevance of 
more inclusive constructions based on social class. 
nergy and pesticides have tended to dwarf the corresponding 
typ
environmental equity, and environmental justice.   Charges of 
                                                                   
 
the Article argues that the diminished power of claims that are framed 
according to the traditional discourse of civil rights and distributive 
justice deserve attention.  Because judicial discourse is a point of 
intersection between critically different systems of public discourse 
(legal, political, economic, scie
plain the rate at which the social identity of the environmental 
justice movement is collapsing. 
Part I reviews the selected cases and the main players.  Part II 
outlines the main elements of the community rhetoric used by the 
plaintiffs to assert their claims.  Part III illustrates the strategic value 
of community rhetoric in constructing a basis for social identity, as 
well as its contested potential as a point of dissention among legal 
adversaries.  Part IV identifies several legal constraints that further 
shape the emerging identity of the movement.  Finally, the conclusion 
evaluates the extent to which the community rheto
I 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
The environmental justice movement is a relatively recent and 
fundamentally distinct adjunct to the traditional environmental 
movement.  The overwhelming majority of environmental groups 
between 1961 and 1990 have been concerned with wildlife, animal 
protection, or more generally, the conservation of land and water 
resources.12  Periodic mobilizations against perceived threats from 
atomic e
es of mobilization that have marked the environmental justice 
wing.13
During the relatively short period of its development, the 
environmental justice movement has been associated with three 
related, but meaningfully distinct labels: environmental racism, 
14
 
12 FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN 
A
En
nsylvania—Was it a Classic Example of 
En
MERICAN POLITICS 184, 185-86 (1993) (discussing the growth of environmental groups). 
13 See generally Giovanna Di Chiro, Nature as Community: The Convergence of 
vironment and Social Justice, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING 
NATURE 298 (William Cronon ed., 1995). 
14 See Barry E. Hill, Chester, Pen
vironmental Justice?  23 VT. L. REV. 479, 486 (1999). 
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wyers and others providing support to 
vic
 traditional civil rights goals under Title VI of 
the
                                                                   
environmental racism emphasize the ways in which racism shapes 
environmental policy.15  Environmental equity includes a broader 
range of local community groups who felt that they were being forced 
to assume a disproportionate share of environmental hazards and 
risks.  Concepts of environmental justice expanded the scope of the 
movement by directing the movement’s attention to the process and 
results of making determinations about the distribution of benefits and 
burdens.  The expansion of public concern to include communities 
that may have been victimized on the basis of income and social class 
is particularly important.  Environmental Poverty Law is a new 
specialty developed by la
timized communities.16
Understandably, the identity of the movement that developed under 
the environmental racism framework has been shaped by its adoption 
of the strategies and tactics of the civil rights movement.17  The 
movement’s identity has been adjusted in order to fit within the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  To some degree, 
this has meant pursuing
 Civil Rights Act.18
Important parallels exist between the contemporary struggles of the 
environmental justice movement to challenge administrative decisions 
concerning the siting of hazardous facilities and an earlier movement 
that emerged in order to oppose the grant or renewal of broadcast 
licenses by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  The 
ability of movement groups to participate directly in administrative 
hearings, or to challenge administrative decisions within the courts, 
were actively pursued by representatives of communities of color.  
Originally, the FCC denied standing to petitioners who could not 
provide evidence of either economic injury or electronic interference 
of their signal.19  The Court reminded the Commission of its own 
earlier decisions regarding standing that were not based on a concern 
for private interests, but the public interests they were licensed to 
serve.  The initial petition charged the station with failing to give a 
 
15 Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Racism!  That’s What It Is., 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
25
ote 14, at 489. 
ental Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U. 
CO
. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
5, 259 (2000). 
16 Hill, supra n
17 See Alice Kaswan, Environm
LO. L. REV. 387, 393 (1999). 
18 42 U.S.C 2000d (1994). 
19 United Church of Christ v
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ty-five percent of 
the
unities because of the 
im
cerned with long-standing civil rights and anti-
po
 their traditional social justice 
concerns to the environmental arena.24
                                                                   
“fair and balanced presentation of controversial issues, especially 
those concerning Negroes, who comprise almost for
 total population within its prime service area.”20
Still, the success of the environmental justice movement may be 
measured by something other than formal court decisions and 
administrative agency rulings.  Negotiated agreements between 
corporations and environmental justice communities have provided 
substantial benefits to members of these comm
portance of environmental justice claims.21
The environmental justice movement argues for an equitable 
distribution of the costs and benefits of maintaining a suitable 
environment in which to live.  This goal is frequently expressed in 
negative terms, such as limiting disparities in the distribution of 
noxious facilities.  Critical assumptions often inform the 
environmental justice movement of the ways in which racism and 
class-based inequalities in power operate to generate disparate 
impacts.  While primarily local in character22 and linked to 
mobilization against a specific decision by a government agency, the 
movement also enjoys the support of a large network of organizations 
traditionally con
verty goals.23
One observer indicates that the vast majority of people active 
within the environmental justice movement are low-income women of 
color.  These activists are also referred to as “new environmentalists” 
because of their recent efforts to extend
A.  Cases 
In each of the selected cases, the plaintiffs relied upon statistical 
comparisons to support claims that they were members of a protected 
class and victims of illegal discrimination.  In each case, the plaintiffs 
 
20 Id. at 998. 
pra note 15, at 270-73. 
on, Acting Locally: Environmental Injustice and 
th
 Lisa A. Binder, Religion, Race, and Rights: A Rhetorical Overview of 
En
21 Lazarus, su
22 See Sherry Cable & Michael Bens
e Emergence of Grass-roots Environmental Organizations, 40 SOC. PROBS. 464, 465 
(1993). 
23 See
vironmental Justice Disputes, 6 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 13 (1999). 
24 See Di Chiro, supra note 13, at 298-320. 
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plaintiffs’ statistical evidence and impugned the motives of the 
issed the 
pla 27
the environmental justice movement because of the legal issues that it 
raised, the visibility it enjoyed, and the status it was granted through 
   
 
also were required to provide the court with compe
criminatory intent. 
1.  Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. 
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. was among the 
first cases holding that a decision to site a landfill may have violated 
an African-American community’s rights to equal protection under 
the law.25  The plaintiffs’ initial motion for a preliminary injunction 
challenged the decision by the Texas Department of Health to grant a 
permit to operate a solid waste facility in their community.  The 
approved site was within 1700 feet of the local high school.  Plaintiffs 
claimed that the siting decision was racially motivated.  However, 
they were unable to provide the courts with the statistical da
alysis that would support the conclusion that substantial racial 
disparity and racial animus was the reason why the community was 
being exposed to risks the waste treatment facility represented. 
The U.S. district court denied the community’s request for a 
preliminary injunction in 1979, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to 
make a compelling case.  Although he characterized the initial siting 
decision as both “unfortunate and insensitive,” the judge concluded 
that the plaintiffs had not yet “established a substantial likelihood of 
proving that the decision to grant the permit was motivated by 
purposeful racial discrimination.”26  Following the procedural route 
implied by the court, the petitioners continued to pursue their cause.  
In 1985, the district court issued a highly critical assessment 
plaintiffs’ expert witness in the case.  The court then dism
intiffs’ complaint and assigned them the costs of the court.
2.  Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 
The residents of Chester, Pennsylvania, pursued their case against 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection all the way 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.28  This case is significant in the history of 
                                                                 
25 See 482 F. Supp 673, 676 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
d Order at 16, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., Civ. A. No. H-
79
26 Id. at 680. 
27 Memorandum an
-2215 (Feb. 1985). 
28 See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 524 U.S. 915 (1998). 
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ermitting program could generate a racially disparate 
ou
have been successful had they 
be
ndered 
the issue moot with the withdrawal of its permit application.33
ronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metropolitan Transportation 
Au
 
the support of the Clinton Administration.29  The case is also 
important because of its implications for the probative value of 
evidence of disparate impact under statutes designed to offer 
protection from intentional discrimination, as well as its failed attempt 
to establish a private right of action against an administrative agency. 
This case is especially important because of the claim that a “race-
neutral” p
tcome. 
Chester residents claimed that construction of a waste treatment 
facility in their community would add to an already intolerable, and 
inequitably distributed, burden of pollution on a poor African-
American community.  The district court denied their petition 
primarily on the basis of a poorly-crafted initial complaint.  However, 
Judge Dalzell’s comments suggested that arguments and evidence 
provided in a response brief might 
en part of the original complaint.30
The plaintiffs interpreted EPA regulations as clearly incorporating 
a discriminatory effect standard, due to the difficulty of demonstrating 
intentional discrimination by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (PADEP).31 On appeal, the circuit court 
concluded that a private right of action did exist.32  Then the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the state environmental agency’s appeal, 
but the case was never heard after the commercial operator re
3.  South B
thority 
Residents of a South Bronx community alleged that the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the New York City Transit 
Authority failed to adequately consider the adverse impact that the 
transformation of a former bus garage into a multi-use industrial 
facility would have on their health and well-being.  They claimed that 
                                                                    
29 An amicus curiae brief in opposition to the defendants motion to dismiss was filed by 
the United States Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
30 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413, 416 (E.D. 
Pa
hester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 929-30 
(3




d Cir. 1997). 
32 Id. at 930. 
33 Seif v. Che
cating as moot 132 F.3d 925 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
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tate sited “obnoxious environmental activity” in minority 
ne
f evidence, noting that the plaintiffs’ counsel had admitted 
in oral testimony that, “our evidence there is not persuasive at this 
point.”35
f the identity of the 
environmental justice movement.  The nature of these constructed 
efine the scope of future interactions. 
dered decisions and 
op
ccepted by the courts, plaintiffs will produce either 
statistics or personal anecdotes in support of a preferred reading of the 
the actions of the defendants were part of a discriminatory policy in 
which the s
ighborhoods, while avoiding the neighborhoods of the state’s white 
residents.34
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim 
for lack o
B.  Principal Players 
This section identifies the main social actors likely involved in a 
typical environmental justice lawsuit.  It shows the ways in which the 
primary actors in each of these cases contributes, perhaps 
unintentionally, to an important modification o
identities d
1.  Courts 
A series of judicial panels, from the local district court to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, have ren
inions that have helped shape the ways in which other players 
negotiate the meaning of environmental justice. 
A set of specific expectations regarding the form of identity of the 
plaintiffs that the courts will accept should help shape the markers of 
identification that plaintiffs in these cases can emphasize in their 
briefs, motions, and complaints.  Depending upon the strategy of 
identification a
relevant facts. 
2.  Administrative Agencies 
In each case, a governmental agency is in charge of making a 
decision that results in the siting of one or more facilities that are 
expected to increase the environmental burden on the surrounding 
community.  Plaintiffs are generally required to include the permitting 
agency among the defendants and articulate a connection between the 
                                                                    
34 South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 20 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 
(S.D. N.Y. 1998). 
35 Id. at 573. 
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lusion from the proceedings.  In 
so
ight exacerbate the risks of routine exposure.  
This can cause, for example, increased risk to people with diets high 
b toxic substances introduced into the 
loc
deral agencies.  The Clinton 
Ad
tal policy.  
Unfortunately, the Executive Order provided little guidance to the 
 
agency’s action and any actual or likely consequences.  These 
agencies often argue for their exc
me cases the agencies claim a constitutional shield of immunity.  
Alternatively, in other cases the agencies claim that responsibility for 
decisions resides at the local level. 
The local, state, and federal agencies assigned responsibility for 
assessing the environmental impact of each facility they approve have 
consistently failed to consider the complex interactions or cumulative 
impact of prior decisions that they, or other agencies, may have 
reached.  Agencies have also been blind to the interactions between 
noxious emissions and the cultural practices of surrounding 
communities that m
in fish and vegetables that absor
al environment.36
3.  The Federal Administration 
The Clinton Administration became actively involved in shaping 
the character and orientation of the environmental justice movement 
in February, 1994, when the president issued Executive Order 
12,898.37  This order was designed to bring greater attention to the 
environmental conditions and the character of life in poor and 
minority communities.  The order sought to improve conditions by 
implementing regulations designed to reduce the discriminatory 
impact of decisions made by fe
ministration hoped for increased participation by members of poor 
and minority communities in governmental decisions that would most 
likely affect their health and safety. 
Clinton’s Executive Order encouraged administrative agencies to 
have greater sensitivity and reflexive monitoring, especially agencies 
with responsibility for health and environmen
                                                                    
36 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF MINORITY ECON. IMPACT, INCORPORATING 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PRINCIPLES INTO THE CERCLA PROCESS, DOE/EH-413 9812, 
6 (1998) (suggesting that the site assessment phase of the remediation process should take 
note of “differential patterns of consumption of fish and wildlife or plants that introduce 
otherwise unanticipated pathways and the potential for increased risks due to multiple and 
cu ter 
th
mulative exposures” as these would be “environmental justice situations that can al
e outcome of the site assessment.”). 
37 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C 4321 (2000). 
 








e VI civil rights 
the Business Network for Environmental 
tigative Guidance would still require 
encies, and the critical response of interested parties in the 
environmental justice movement have barely increased.38
As the controversy regarding the environmental justice movemen
reased, the label of “Environmental Justice Communities” emerged 
to identify the unique status of the minority and poor communities.39
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a series of 
draft guidelines intended to establish a standard for investigating 
complaints about permits that raised environmental justice concerns.  
A coalition represented by the Center on Race, Poverty, & the
ironment expressed disappointment and dismay over the direction 
EPA appeared to take in its guidelines.  The coalition argued that
[I]n almost every policy decision in the Guidance, EPA has chosen 
to hurt the civil rights complainant, and help the civil rights 
violator. . . . Because the Guidance is a significant step backward by 
EPA, and would virtually ensure that no Titl
complaint filed with EPA would ever be successful, we request that 
EPA scrap the current Guidance and begin again.40
The response from industry was that “[u]nfortunately, the draft 
revised investigation guidance [did] not provide the predictability and 
certainty . . . crucial to any effective environmental-permitting 
process.”41  Therefore, 
Justice concluded that the Inves
“substantial revision.”42
                                                                    
38 See Valerie P. Mahoney, Note, Environmental Ju
Complete Solutions, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 401-03 (1999) (discussing responses to the
stice: From Partial Victories to 
 
Executive Order). 
39 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into 
EP
uke Cole, Director, Center on Race, Poverty, and the Environment, 
to
nvironmental Quality, National 
A Permitting Authority, 26 Ecology L.Q. 617, 621-22 (1999) (referring to 
environmental justice communities as communities that have “historically lacked the 
resources needed to monitor polluting facilities in their  neighborhoods for possible 
violations and, if found, to negotiate their correction, to persuade federal or state 
enforcement officials to take action, or to bring citizen suit enforcement actions against 
violating facilities.”). 
40 See Letter from L
 Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA 2 (Aug. 26, 2000), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/t6com2000_071.pdf. 
     41 See Letter from Keith W. McCoy, Director of E
Association of Manufacturers, to the U.S. EPA, Office of Civil Rights 1 (August 28, 2000) 
available at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/ t6com2000_054.pdf. 
42 Id. 
 




 superior to government intervention, 
critics 
 The Agents of Harm 
The evolution of the environmental justice movement has been 
accompanied by a shifting emphasis from the activities of individual 
polluters to the decisions made by administrative agencies.  Decisions 
approving of the routine practices of agencies combine to make life in 
poor and minority communities intolerable. 
The agents of harm are typically involved in the management of 
waste, the production of energy, or the production of goods and 
services that have accompanying “spillover effects.”  Spillover effects 
include externalities that impose costs on individuals and 
communities who may, or may not, be compensated for that harm.  
Traditional perspectives within the discipline of welfare economics 
assume that action by a government agency is warranted in order to 
control the production and distribution of these harms.43  A more 
conservative view, generally associated with the Nobel laureate, 
Ronald Coase, argues that a better response to spillover effects is to 
pursue transactions between those who injure, and those who are 
injured.44  Framing the issue in this way normalizes the production of 
spillover effects.  The issue becomes the assignment of rights: the 
right to engage in commercial activities that generate noxious 
spillovers, or the right to live and raise one’s family in a healthy 
environment. 
In the absence of compensation, or the requirement that spillovers 
be contained, granting the right to pollute is a political act that 
legitimates the distribution of harm.  Welfare economists generally 
agree that if amenity rights are assigned to the victims, instead of the 
polluters, then the optimal level of spillover would be smaller.45  
While the Coasean perspective views negotiation between polluters
and local property owners as
suggest that the assumptions of equality between contending 
parties simply do not hold in most negotiations of this type.46  Unlike 
the traditional environmentalists who directed their efforts toward the 
reduction of noxious spillovers, the environmental justice movement 
focused its attention on managing the distribution of spillovers. 
                                                                    
43 See E.J. MISHAN, WHAT POLITICAL ECONOMY IS ALL ABOUT 137, 144-45 (1982) 
(d
LTURE OF A CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE 
22
iscussing environmental spillovers and the law). 
44 See MELVIN W. REDER, ECONOMICS: THE CU
3-28 (1999) (discussing the Coase Theorem and the role of the state). 
45 MISHAN, supra note 43, at 141. 
46 REDER, supra note 44, at 227. 
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 concerns and activities generally understood to be outside 
5.  The Aggrieved Community 
In the Bean, Chester Residents, and South Bronx cases, community 
based organizations have assumed, or have been assigned, the role of 
plaintiff.  In some cases, the community organizations have claimed 
to represent the interests of a class of victims.  In each case, it is 
reasonable to characterize these plaintiffs as making progress toward 
developing a collective identity as a community-based social 
movement. 
With rare exceptions, the voice of the community is heard through 
the motions, briefs, and testimony of their attorneys.  Lawyers who 
have communities, rather than corporations or individuals as their 
clients, represent a unique legal practice.47  It seems likely that the 
lawyers who help shape the meaning of environmental justice through 
a community-based practice will develop a collective identity not 
unlike those of the lawyers whose arguments before the nation’s 
courts shaped the identity of the civil rights movement.48
One practitioner describes the practice of community lawyers as 
being “located in poor, disempowered, and subordinated 
communities” and “dedicated to serving the communities’ goals.”49  
He argues that “the goal for community lawyers should include 
assisting clients to create power and lasting institutions with the 
ability to influence the clients’ environment, rather than solely the 
creation or enforcement of rights or providing remedies to legal 
wrongs.”50  The power of a community-based social movement 
within the law may be overwhelmed in courtrooms and administrative 
hearings where corporate actors and agency representatives can 
display a wealth of talent and resources.51
Michael Diamond’s discussion of community lawyering 
emphasizes
                                                                    
47 See Michael Diamond, Community Law ering: R visiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 
e traditional 
co  movement and its advocates to include economic inequality). 
, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 246, 
25
y  e
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 69 (2000). 
48 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERICA, 214-15, 268 (1976) (discussing the role of Howard University trained 
lawyers in the early days of the civil rights movement and the expansion of th
ncerns of that
49 Id. at 75. 
50 Id. at 108-09. 
51 See generally R. Gregory Roberts, Comment, Environmental Justice and Community 
Empowerment: Learning from the Civil Rights Movement
3-54 (1998). 
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the
the “black community.”54 Like Diamond, 
Au




Because of such differences in ive, shoring up the identity 
of e 
agencies ch ties.   In 
ad
 
 bounds of conventional legal practice.52  He also takes notice of 
the methods in which community representation ultimately shapes 
conventional legal practice.53  Challenges faced by public interest 
lawyers working on behalf of impoverished communities include 
competing interests, incompatible goals, and reliance on different 
strategies. 
Similar concerns have been raised by Regina Austin regarding the 
evolving constructions of 
stin appreciates the problem of conflict within the community for 
those who provide legal advice and representation to the community.  
In reflecting on the problem of “lawbreakers” within the African-
American community, Austin underscores the importance of having 
legal advocates who a
 legal and the illegal.55
In addition, substantial differences of opinion exist within the 
community about whether the trade-offs between opposing an 
environmentally-risky industrial facility or welcoming that same 
facility as a prospective employer represent a good deal or a
56
 perspect
 the “community of concern” will be difficult for the administrativ
arged with environmental justice responsibili 57
dition, courts required to assess the nature and extent of the 
disparate impacts of discrimination may have significant difficulties. 
                                                                    
52 Diamond, supra note 47, at 69. 
. Binder, Religion, Race, and Rights: A 
Rh
53 Id. at 108. 
54 See Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of 
Identification, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 293, 293 (Richard 
Delgado ed., 1995). 
55 Id. at 301. 
56 A divided African-American community in St. James Parish, Louisiana disagreed 
about the costs and benefits that would be derived from the development of a polyvinyl 
chloride plant along the Mississippi River.  Lisa A
etorical Overview of Environmental Justice Disputes, 6 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 37-59 
(1999) (discussing the Shintech case). 
57 Daniel Isales, Environmental Justice and Title VI: The Administrative Remedy, 18 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 125, 130-31 (2000). 
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THE CONTEXT OF 
                                                                   
 
II 
ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF COMMUNITY IN 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 
The community rhetoric can be a useful tool with which to study 
the environmental justice movement.  A central concern of the 
movement is the notion of an “endangered community”58 or a 
“defended neighborhood.”59  Several key elements in the rhetoric of 
community are used strategically by the proponents of the 
environmental justice movement in their claims. 
The growing complexity of the modern society poses a difficult 
problem for community studies.  The concept of community as an 
organizational framework proved inadequate for depicting aspects of 
society in which empirical propositions could be formulated, tested, 
and generalized.  However, parallel to the demise of the concept of 
community as a useful abstraction60 and its subsequent replacement 
with different terms like neighborhood or locale,61 the idea of 
“community” gained increasing relevance as a rhetorical tool in 
public speech. 
The concept of community as discourse emerged as an integrative 
framework for understanding how social actors index the notion of 
community to their individual experience.62  The key point in this 
paradigmatic change regards community not exclusively as an 
institutional structure or social action, as sociology did until the 




 CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITIES (1972) 
(d ough the 
cr r example, its forbidding reputation). 






ment to community.  We 
nd 
s.   
A
58 Clarice E. Gaylord & Geraldine W. Twitty, Protecting Endangered Communities, 21
RDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 771-86 (1994). 
59 Cf. GERALD D. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL
efining “defended neighborhood” as a residential group that seals itself thr
eation of symbolic borders as a result of, fo
60
See Graham Day & Jonathan Murdoch, Locality and Community: Coming to Ter
 Place, 41 SOC. REV. 82, 82-111 (1993). 
A. C. Pratt, Discourses of Locality, 23 ENV’T & PLAN. 257, 257-67 (1991). 
Day & Murdoch, supra note 61, at 82. 
We confront an empirical phenomenon: people’s attach
seek understanding of it by trying to capture some sense of their experience a
of the meanings they attach to community.  Thus, moving away from the earlier 
emphasis our discipline placed on structure, we approach community as a 
phenomenon of culture: as one, therefore, which is meaningfully constructed by 
people through their symbolic prowess and resource
NTHONY P. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY 38 (1987). 
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some institutional 
dis
r to that of other communities in the 
same situation.  The significance of the disruptive event and the 
solidarity with communities ations are critical elements 
in 70
 
analyses of the Chicago School regarding the social ecology of 
community transitioned to an emphasis on the symbolic ecology of 
social groups employing boundaries as metaphors.65  From this point 
of view, community as discourse emphasizes “the shared base of 
stories, [the] realities . . . conveyed, and even how [the] stories are 
told.”66  The downside of this approach, however, is the tendency to 
represent community as univocal discourse, either because of the 
common geographical space of the social actors (community as 
locale), their common position in respect to 
course (community as audience), their common placement on the 
political board (communities of interest), or their common habitual 
practices (community of choice67).  Consequently, an accounting is 
required of the manner in which the explicit engagement with various 
social networks is shaping the experience and identity associated with 
the notion of community68 and, conversely, how community and 
communal identity are shaping institutional sites. 
The placement of a toxic facility is responsible for affecting the 
entire community dynamic, from disrupting everyday life and 
stigmatization, to new patterns of organizational involvement.69  
Minority communities confronted with the threat of toxic exposure 
regard their experience as simila
 in similar situ
the establishment of a sense of community.   Claims of solidarity 
and signficance represent strategic rhetorical resources with which 
                                                                    
65 See, e.g., Margaret E. Montoya, Border/Ed Identities: Narrative and the Social 
Construction of Legal and Personal Identities, in CROSSING BOUNDARIES: TRADITIONS 
AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH, 129-59 (A. Sarat et al. eds., 
1998) (discussing the formation of Latino/a identities). 
se 




, Community Dynamics in Coping 
wi
n & Abraham Wandersman eds., 1987). 
66 David R. Maines & Jeffrey C. Bridger, Narrative, Community, and Land U
Decisions, 29 SOC. SCI. J. 363, 377 (1992). 
67 Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL  EV  
000) (using the term “communities of choice” to describe communities formed through 
voluntary associations, such as communities of gays and lesbians). 
68 Day & Murdoch, supra note 61, at 82.  This is also the position advocated by Bulmer 
when he argues for making an explicit link between modern ne
litical engagement.  See Martin Bulmer, The Rejuvenation of Community Studies?  
Neighbours, Networks and Policy, 33 SOC. REV. 430, 430-48 (1985). 
69 Michael R. Edelstein & Abraham Wandersman
th Toxic Contaminants, in NEIGHBORHOOD AND COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTS 69 
(Irwin Altma
70 David B. Clark, The Concept of Community: A Re-Examination, 21 SOC. REV. 397, 
404 (1973). 
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asserting 
so
hich more than 500 
pe
e when pursuing their 
cl  
 
   
 
communities express their identity.  Therefore, the basis for 
lidarity and significance in the context of the environmental justice 
movement must be understood. 
A.  Solidarity 
Communities can derive various forms of solidarity from the 
perception of an environmental threat.  A community’s identity may 
be defined in terms of race, ethnicity, class, culture, or simply by its 
relation to a common place (understood as geographic locale, physical 
boundary, or social space).71
1.  Identity as Common Perception of Environmental Threat 
The perception of environmental threat increases the sense of 
solidarity among the residents of the affected areas.  An example is 
the locally organized opposition of African-American residents in 
Warren County, North Carolina in 1982, in w
ople rallied in opposition to the dumping of PCB waste near their 
community.72  However, unlike mainstream environmentalism, 
illustrated by the struggle at Love Canal twelve years earlier, 
environmental justice solidarity is constituted from the interplay 
between environment, identity, and rights.73  A section of the 
environmental justice rhetoric is framed in opposition to 
environmentalism that attempts to preserve the purity of nature 
abstracted from the people that populate it, while admitting risk 
uncertainties dictated by market efficiency.  For nontraditional 
environmental justice proponents, the new endangered species are 
people of color and low socioeconomic status.74
The focus on rights and their relation to racial identity is crucial in 
determining the legal venue residents will choos
aims.  Communities seeking environmental justice typically start
their litigation as a claim of unconstitutional discrimination and
                                                                 
71 Donna M. Johnson, Who Is We?  Constructing Communities in U.S.-Mexico Border 
Discourse, 5 DISCOURSE AND SOC’Y 207, 215-17 (1994) (discussing discursive strategies 
of enforcing solidarity through references to a common place).   
72 Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnson, Environmental Justice:  Grassroots Activism 
an
NEIGHBORHOODS: COMMUNITY PLANNING GUIDE, SAN DIEGO (1993) 
(a
d Its Impact on Public Policy Decision Making, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 555, 556 (2000). 
73 See also Di Chiro, supra note 13, at 298. 
74 Gaylord & Twitty, supra note 58, at 771; see also ENVT’L HEALTH COALITION, 
TOXIC-FREE 
ssociating demand for ecological policies in balance with nature with the need to honor 
the cultural integrity of the community). 
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dem nd 
dem e.  
Inte tal 
law  
com pursue claims under the Equal Protection 
Cl
ly because society has not developed a 
measuring certain forms of air 
warrant for the 
as
and equitable relief, rather than claiming toxic risk a
anding civil and financial liability under the mass torts doctrin
restingly, although plaintiffs seeking relief under environmen
s are thought to have much higher chances of success,75
munities often opt to 
ause.  The statistical sophistication demanded by the judges in 
environmental justice trials in respect to harm and minority 
definition76 differ with the common sense, general social standards 
employed by the judge in Chester v. Delcora:77
The odor emission regulation may not be precise, but statutes do not 
become unconstitutional because of an absence of “mathematical 
certainty.”  The Court will not strike the regulation down under 
[the] due process clause simp
scientific methodology for 
pollution.78
The legal venue chosen by affected communities in environmental 
justice trials attests to the importance of racial and ethnic identity, 
used both as a means of identification and as a 
signment of blame.  Perhaps, the tendency of mass tort litigation to 
focus on monetary settlement rather than the non-monetary harm to 
the plaintiff79 renders that type of legal action much less rhetorically 
attractive to the communities. 
                                                                    
75 According to some estimations, 70% of the toxic substances cases succeed under the 
tort doctrine.  Neil Vidmar, Maps, Gaps, Sociolegal Scholarship, and the Tort Reform 
Debate, in SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 170 (Patricia Edwick et al. 
eds., 1999). 
76  
ir Pollution Control Act, 35 P.S. § 4001 
et fendant rebutted the claim on grounds of vagueness, subjectivity and 
am
). 
See Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass’n v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202; 1209-10 (E.D.
N.Y. 1987) (discussing Pearson’s formula for testing the correlation between non-Hispanic 
whites and the number of homeless in the community district). 
77 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Delcora Sewage, No. C.A. 94-
5639, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15875, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1994); the plaintiff (which we find 
also in Chester Residents v. Seif) alleged federal and state law violations caused by 
“malodorous air contaminants” from Delcora Sewage Treatment Plant, under Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4701 et seq. and Pennsylvania A
 seq.  The De
biguity in the statute definition of “malodors”. 
78 Id. at *5. 
79 D.R. HENSLER, THE REAL WORLD OF TORT LITIGATION: EVERYDAY PRACTICES 
AND TROUBLE CASES 170 (1998
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es or labels by which disfavored groups 
Identity may facilitate, or limit the development of a multiracial 
so
African-American youth in the nation’s cities.  At the extreme, an 
   
 
2.  Racial and Ethnic Identity 
Racial and ethnic identity is widely recognized as both the product 
and the source of many of the complex relationships between people 
and institutions that are included in discrimination.80
The nature and salience of an individual’s identity is not fixed at 
birth.81  Indeed, we are increasingly interested in discovering the 
nature of the cues that are present in particular interpersonal contexts 
that activate the racial and ethnic identities of the participants in such 
encounters.  Note, for example, that the importance of racial or ethnic 
identity, as it relates to one’s self-concept, not only varies across 
racial and ethnic groups, but varies across the settings within which 
routine interactions with others may be marked by more or less 
conflict and risk.  First, racial identity is more important to African-
Americans than it is for other groups in society.  Evidence also 
suggests that for African-Americans, racial identity is more important 
at work than at home, in the neighborhood, or in the general public.82
Recognition of an individual’s identity as a member of a group is 
also important and may be determined in part by common features 
observable by others.  The old adage, “if it looks like a duck,” also 
includes behavioral indicators such as, “walks like a duck, swims like 
a duck, eats and sounds like a duck,” that point conclusively to an 
individual’s membership in the community of ducks.  Because of the 
strong correlation between behavioral attributes and group 
membership, discriminatory intent may be hidden behind reference to 
behaviors, rather than the nam
and communities are known.83
cial movement on the basis of a common class position.  Such a 
movement would have to overcome the difficulties associated with 
the development of oppositional racial identities, especially among 
                                                                 
80 Deborah Frable, Gender, Racial, Ethnic, Sexual, and Class Identities, 48 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 139, 147-48 (1997). 
81 STEPHEN CORNELL AND DOUGLAS HARTMANN, ETHNICITY AND RACE 72 (1998). 
82 Charles Jaret & Donald Reitzes, The Importance of Racial-Ethnic Identity and Social 
Setting for Blacks, Whites, and Multiracials, 42 SOC. PERSP. 711, 724 (1999). 
83 See Jason Leckerman, Comment, City of Brotherly Love?: Using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to Strike Down an Anti-Homeless Ordinance in Philadelphia, 3 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 540, 562 (2001) (discussing references to behavior, rather than group identity). 
 




nt the same physical space, may differ in 
term uracy with which attributes of that 
space aps exist to serve a particular 
int
oppositional identity invites and reinforces alienation from potential 
partners within a social movement.84
There are important differences within and between the categories 
that define racial and ethnic groups.85  Plaintiffs differ in the 
precision with which they define the racial composition of th
y claim to represent.  Plaintiffs emphasize differences between the 
victims and the oppressors, while defendants seek to exploit the 
differences among plaintiffs. 
3.  Identity as a Link to an Identifiable Physical Space 
One’s identity as a member of a community is traditionally based 
upon residence within the confines of an identifiable physical space.  
Although we think of space in terms of physical markers, the 
selection of those markers is not random and will always reflect the 
exercise of power and influence.  Spatial relations between 
community residences, community resources, and noxious facilities 
and activities play a central role in defining the communities at risk.  
Distance from facilities is generally the critical spatial index. 
Consider, for example, the use of a map to indicate the location of 
a community, and the proposed site for a treatment facility.  Two 
maps, assumed to represe
s of the completeness and acc
are represented on the map.  M
erest, and quite often the interests being served are hidden from 
view.86  Consider the rules that determine which features of the 
environment are “permanent enough” to justify the creation of a 
symbol for use in printing topographic maps by the U.S. Geological 
Survey.  While the maps may characterize the “hard or improved 
surface” road that carries the garbage through the community, neither 
the trucks nor their noxious loads are likely to appear on those maps.  
Smells, sounds, and other things that cannot be photographed are also 
absent from maps.87  Not even a map developed by the local 
                                                                    
84 See William E. Cross, Oppositional Identity and African American Youth: Issues and 
Pro
86 DENIS WOOD, THE POWER OF MAPS, 70-94 (1992). 
spects, in TOWARD A COMMON DESTINY: IMPROVING RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 
IN AMERICA 185 (Willis Hawley & Anthony Jackson eds., 1995) (discussing alienation 
between middle class whites and blacks). 
85 See Eric Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 311, 323 (2001) (arguing against the general tendency of the courts to 
assume that the interests of all minority groups are the same). 
87 Id. at 85. 
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T s of the environmental justice movement have 
usua  the fact that the notion of community 
en
varies substantially.  Although the evidence is hard to gather, racial 
prejudice, especially with regard to African-Americans, continues to 
be a powerful determinant of residential segregation.90  Highly 
se the result of urban planning policies.  
   
environmental protection agency would capture these forms of 
environmental pollution. 
a.  Differential Social Spaces 
he commentator
lly overlooked
compasses very different social space and treats communities 
interchangeably.  The difference between a suburban community and 
a city neighborhood, for example, rests both in the array of concerns 
and in the social organization of the residents around different notions 
of space.  Since toxic landfills are usually located in the suburbs, 
claims of discriminatory noxious sitings are more characteristic for 
suburban communities.  In contrast, concern for the discriminatory 
enforcement of public policies such as zoning, housing, and access to 
public services is likely to be in the realm of neighborhoods. 
A neighborhood is a social entity that exists in structural, rather 
than sentimental, relation to the physical space.  This means that 
neighborhood solidarity, in this case, is based on complex and 
heterogeneous identities resulting from racialized spaces and class 
cleavages, coupled with the awareness of a common fate before the 
city planners, who may or may not draw the same cognitive maps and 
boundaries as the residents of the neighborhood.88  Therefore, 
community and neighborhood are not synonymous. 
b.  Boundaries 
The boundaries of communities are the product of social, 
economic, and historical processes.  These processes include 
migrations, the enforcement of racially discriminatory zoning policies 
that reproduced and amplified the results of discriminatory mortgage 
lending practices.89  The racial composition of communities also 
gregated neighborhoods are 
                                                                 
88 SUTTLES, supra note 59, at 33-37. 
89 See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, 
Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 
441-42 (1998). 
90 Camille Z. Charles, Neighborhood Racial-composition Preferences: Evidence from a 
Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. PROBS. 379, 401 (2000). 
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eighborhoods tends to be higher.
n order to prevent a public 
po
unities are often 
ch
 
Urban renewal projects of the 1960s relocated residents and produced 
urban wastelands.  The more modern aesthetic ideologies of the 1980s 
then caused the migration of wealthier residents to neighborhoods 
with “historic ambiance,” which drove property values up and caused 
less affluent residents to move out.91  As the proportion of African-
American residents in a neighborhood varies, racial tension and 
conflicts increase.  As a result, the salience of racial identity for 
residents in those n 92
Researchers prefer to regard neighborhoods as entities with shifting 
borders defined by physical obstructions (railroads, streets, etc.) that 
limit the access of outsiders.  In contrast, suburban or rural 
communities have borders that are usually defined by natural 
geographical markers.  However, neighborhoods may define 
themselves as political units, such as city districts.  Also, in contrast 
to rural communities whose traditional attachment to the land acts as 
a liaison between residents,93 the neighborhood is regarded as a nexus 
of mixed loyalties.  A neighborhood is likely to enter into temporary 
alliances with different neighborhoods i
licy that would impact its identity.  An example is the coalition 
between block associations of African-Americans in East Elmhurst 
and the white Jackson Heights neighborhoods to prevent the New 
York Port Authority from building an automated guided train to La 
Guardia airport.94
The boundaries of neighborhoods and comm
anged to modify the effective political power that residents are able 
to wield through elections.  Gerrymandering is a term that describes 
drawing geopolitical boundaries in an effort to control the exercise of 
political power.  Racial redistricting in some southern states used to 
be used to ensure that there would be no legislative districts in which 
African-Americans would be the majority of registered voters.  
Following the Voting Rights Act of 1982, the creation of jurisdictions 
                                                                    
91 A. Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21 
FO
a  Use 
AN URBAN 
CO nographic analysis of the 
re
RDHAM URB. L.J. 461, 482 (1994). 
92 Jaret & Reitzes, supra note 82, at 725-26. 
93 David R. Maines & Jeffrey C. Bridger, Narratives, Community and L nd
Decisions, 29 SOC. SCI. J. 363, 371-76 (1992) (exemplifying the construction of local 
communitarian identity in Lancaster County, PA through narratives of land use). 
94 STEVEN GREGORY, BLACK CORONA:  RACE AND POLITICS OF PLACE IN 
MMUNITY 190-93 (1998) (presenting a highly detailed eth
sidents in Corona and East Elmhurst, in the borough of Queens, New York). 
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ms, the Clinton Administration welcomed the 
development of place, rather than race-based, interventions.96  
Nevertheless, the selection on income or social class 
en
urdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly 
depending 
   
 
where African-Americans would be in the majority became a 
controversial affirmative public policy.95
Following the mobilization of opposition to affirmative action and 
other race-based progra
 of places based 
counters problems of community identity brought about by the 
presence of whites who are not traditionally poor. 
However, the traditional reluctance of the Supreme Court to 
interfere with state policies of resource allocation, coupled with the 
legal ambiguity of class (as defined by wealth) as a legal basis for 
classification and the refusal to recognize the connection between race 
and wealth, make the claims of neighborhood discrimination 
particularly difficult to succeed.  For example, in an early case of 
discrimination concerning education funds, the Supreme Court 
maintained that the class of poor people is not definable and that “[i]t 
is not within the constitutional prerogative of the United States 
Supreme Court to nullify statewide measures for financing public 
services merely because the b
upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in 
which citizens live.”97
B.  Significance 
The significant we is defined by both similar and different 
communities.  We is contrasted with the otherness represented by 
industry and government officials.98  These officials are generally 
perceived as unhelpful and unconcerned for the residential quality of 
                                                                 
95 KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS 93-111 (1997). 
96 See Miguel de Oliver & Teresa Dawson-Munoz, Place-not-race?: The Inadequacy of 
Geography to Address Racial Disparities, 25 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 37, 39 (1996). 
97 Mexican-American residents of the Edgewood Independent School District in Bexar 
Co
tech’s proposed facility, and 
no
unty, Texas, challenged all the school districts in the San Antonio metropolitan area and 
alleged that the Texas statutory system that allowed each independent school district to 
supplement the funds received from the state by collecting taxes for use exclusively within 
that particular school district, had a discriminatory impact on poor districts and violated 
the equal protection right of the children in those districts.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
98 See Binder, supra note 23, at 34-35 (analyzing the hearing at the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality in the context of Shin
ting that the label of “outsider” applied to the siting advocates, who were accused of 
seeking to exploit the community for their own benefits and according to their own 
agenda). 
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1.  Identity as Symbolic Unit 
es are identified by name.  The 
na
 
life and usually suspected of mixed motivations.99  The 
ideographical100 use of community is created in opposition to the 
actions of external agencies.  Community significance is constructed 
by its internal identification as a symbolic unit, its dependence or 
autonomy to a larger unit that contributes to the development of a 
symbolic border as a means for external identification, and the 
emphasis on the common experience of oppression. 
As symbolic units, communiti
mes of communities often reveal a particular aspect about the 
residents and their identity.  The names assigned to neighborhoods 
may reflect their historical origins, their physical characteristics, or 
the ways in which their residents were regarded by those in authority.  
Philadelphia, often described as a “city of neighborhoods,” has had 
many names that describe the race and ethnicity of its residents in the 
past (Germantown, The Black Bottom, Jewtown, Irishtown).  Media 
amplification of police banter has recently earned one neighborhood 
the distinction of being named “The Badlands.”101
2.  Identity as Symbolic Boundary 
Geopolitical boundaries are symbolic boundaries.  These 
boundaries are defined by levels of aggregation and errors due to 
assumptions made about the characteristics of the populations within 
those aggregations.102  Data provided by the United States Census 
                                                                    
99 See generally Stephanie A. Welcomer et al., Resisting the Discourse of Modernity: 
Rationality Versus Emotion in Hazardous Waste Siting, 53 HUM. REL. 1175 (2000) 
(analyzing the opposition of a community in Clarion County, PA, to the siting of severa  l
waste disposal facilities by Concord Resources Group, Inc.  The authors identify mistrust 





gories of s.  This research was 
the result of a 16-month participatory observation and content analysis of public texts.  
The analysis emphasizes the disruption of identity and the residents’ adversarial framing 
of their engagement with industry and govern en ficials). 
100 For a theoretical discussion of ideographs as ideologically-loaded words employed 
strategically in public rhetoric to influence the decision in a particular situation, see 
generally Michael Calvin McGee, The Ideograph: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 
66 Q.J. SPEECH 1 (1980). 
101 PHILADELPHIA INFORMATION LOCATOR 
EIGHBORHOODS AND PLACE NAMES, at http://www
lacname.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2004). 
102 MARK MONMONIER, HOW TO LIE WITH MAPS 12-17 (1991).  See also GARY KING, 
A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM (1997) (discussing the problems 
with drawing inferences from aggregate data). 
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transition are rarely communities because whites 
and blacks are clustered into separate enclaves within the zip cluster.  
n integrated communities.107
 
Bureau are often relied upon in characterizing the population of 
aggregates such as a state and the smallest definable u
ck.103  Other administrative units, such as congressional districts 
and zip codes, are also used as the basis for defining a community.  
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) provide a technological 
means for assessing the relationships between attributes that define 
and differentiate communities.104  Geodemographic segmentation is 
one process that reflects the adaptation of spatial data to the needs of 
economic and political strategists.105  The link between the zip code 
and the identity of the community or neighborhood it refers to, is
tablished empirically by means of proprietary cluster analysis 
routines designed to maximize similarity within, and differences 
between, the communities identified by the method. Depending upon 
the needs of the client, or the techniques developed by the analysts,106 
the thousands of unique communities definable at the zip code level 
are grouped into a small number of neighborhood types. 
The periodic reassessment of the status of communities identified 
through clustering analysis reveals some of the ways in which change 
takes place.  Communities in transition can go from primarily black to 
white, through a process of gentrification.  Transition also goes from 
white to black, often “tipping” quite rapidly once the process starts.  
Neighborhoods in 
Such communities are hybrid, rather tha
Clearly there are no well developed standards that specify the 
appropriate racial identity of a community.  The correct proportion of 
the population within a particular geopolitical unit required to be 
African-American for that community to be identified as a black 
community is unknown.  This balance evokes memories of the history 
of racial classification more generally.  At different stages in the 
history of the United States an unstable mix of rules determined 
whether or not an individual would be identified under the law as a 
                                                                    
103 Five digit zip codes may include 2,320 households; a census tract around 1,270; and 
a census block approximately 340 households. 
104 MICHAEL R. CURRY, DIGITAL PLACES 45-47 (1998). 
105 MICHAEL J. WEISS, THE CLUSTERING OF AMERICA 10-15 (1988). 
106 RIZM service 
id names like “Hard Scrabble,” 
“P  United 
St
Jonathan Robbin’s initial clustering solution developed for his P
entified forty “lifestyle clusters” and assigned characteristic 
ublic Assistance,” and “Money and Brains” to each of 36,000 zip codes in the
ates.  Id. at xi-xvi. 
107 Id. at 251-59 (discussing “communities in transition”). 
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cts his or her support for, 
or
Identity may also be based on a claim to shared rights. African-
Americans have claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a 
                                                                   
 
Negro.  The so-called “one-drop rule,” or the rule of “hypo-descent,” 
meant that having a single black or African ancestor was sufficient for 
an individual to be assigned a legal designation as black in many 
southern states.108
3.  Common Experience of Oppression 
Communities may identify and be identified by their common 
experience of oppression or victimization.109  The nature of this 
oppression is frequently illustrated by reference to, or comparison 
with, the experience or status of others, or by the identification of a 
pattern of discriminatory acts over time.  Identification by race and 
class, therefore, usually involves comparing the 
ivileged, whether determined by race, class, or some combination. 
The dependence or autonomy of the community to a larger unit, such 
as the region or the city, are especially salient as the allegations of 
discrimination are likely to rest on statistical comparisons between the 
aggrieved community and white communities or the larger 
geographic, economic, or social unit to which the aggrieved
mmunity belongs.  Such comparisons usually draw on the racial 
composition of the community, the disproportionate amount of 
burdens, the level of health risk, and statistical proof of 
disadvantages. 
Identity as the basis of assumed common experience is articulated 
as a theory of “linked fate.”110  The greater the sense of linked fate, 
the more consistently a person’s race predi
 opposition to, public policies that might determine fate.  Thus, 
African-Americans who strongly identify with their racial group are 
likely to support affirmative action, reparations, and other policies 
that benefit African-Americans.  Belief in common fate is also 




 Social Construction of Risk 
Am
108 F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?  ONE NATION’S DEFINITION 113 (1991). 
109 Cornell and Hartmann offer a “constructionist” explanation for the existence and 
salience of racial and ethnic identities that includes due consideration of oppressive 
relations.  Supra note 81, at 72. 
110 MICHAEL DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN AMERICA
LITICS 76-80 (1994). 
111 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Racial Identity, Media Use, and the
ong African Americans, 31 J. BLACK STUD. 600, 613-14 (2001). 
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basis for rights under the law yed by 
criterion of 




ther than a substantial material 




ation of due process and 
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment established that rights 
                                                                   
equivalent to the rights enjo
people identified as white.  In this regard, racial identification, as a 
membership, becomes a token of entitlement, and a 
valued resource akin to property.112
Rights based on experience, and the assumption of discrimination 
or victimization, have been developed through legislative and judicial 
action taken on behalf of peopl
ve much in common with rights established for people defined by
ce, gender, or sexual orientation.  Membership in these communitie
ds not to be voluntary, and is marked by an assumption of within-
group homogeneity, rather than difference. 
Other group perspectives formulate group identity based on a 
perception of common injury, although in many cases the harm thus 
defined is an injury to self-esteem, ra
114
basis for the development of a community-based soci
III 
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE COMMUNITY-BASED SOCIAL IDENTITY 
In attempts to pursue justice before the courts, representatives of 
communities have had to apply for class certifications on the basis of 
inadequately defined, logically incompatible, and statistically 
insignificant group distinctions. 
A.  Race, Class, and Culture as the Basis of Community Identity 
Explicit references to the race, class, and culture of the plaintiff
ir complaints have been designed to both influence and comply 
with the demands of the judicial process.  The broad functions and the 
polarizing character of these claims have varied as the environmental 
justice movement evolved over time. 
1.  Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. 
The complaint in Bean claimed a viol
 




See Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically: Formal and Collective Aspects of 
Legal Rights, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 409, 438-40 (1999). 
114 See Mariana Valverde, Identity Politics and the Law in the United States
MINIST STUD. 345, 347 (1999) (discussing the perspective of Wendy Bro
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joyed by white citizens should be the basis for comparison in due 
process claims.  The defendants, Southwestern Waste Management 
(SWM), were accused of discrimination, but members of the plaintiff 
class were not identified by race.115  Therefore, the defendant 
challenged an unstated assumption of racial homogenei
ss.  In its motion to dismiss, SWM denied “that the class of all 
property owners described . . . [was] proper because such class 
certainly included persons of various racial and ethnic backgrounds[,] 
all of whom cannot simultaneously have a cause of action. . . .”116
In their amended complaint, plaintiffs moved closer to identifying 
themselves by race.  They argued that the defendant’s action was 
“part of a pattern, practice or scheme . . . to unconstitutionally 
discriminate against racial minorities . . . by placing such facilities in 
areas that are predominantly Black and minority.”117  They claimed 
that the geographic area that defined the community was over 75
nority and over 54% African-American. 
Distinctions between the interests of Mexican-Americans and 
African-Americans have occasionally been made in Texas courts.118  
However, the plaintiffs in Bean sought to erase, rather than emphasize 
those distinctions.  Subsequent briefs and responses referred almost 
exclusively to the neighborhoods as “minority areas.”119
Following the decision of the district court in 1979 to deny their 
request, partly on the basis of their failure to prove discriminatory 
intent, the plaintiffs continued to pursue their goal.  In an amended 
class certification motion submitted to the court in 1981, the plaintiffs 
identified their neighborhood as being “predominately black.”120  
They identified their subpart of Census Tract (224.03) as being 82.6% 
black.  The neighborhood reportedly laid within a “virtually all black 
                                                                    
115 Complaint at 1-3, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., Civ. A. No. H-79-2215 (Oct. 
1979). 
116 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
117 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 4, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 





tiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at 4, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
eory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1132, 1158-59 (1997) (discussing claims by the League of United 
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) that the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury 
service in Texas was a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; the 
urt reasoned that the Amendment was concerned only with the interests of whites and 
egroes, and not Hispanics as a third racial class). 
119 Plaintiffs’ More Definite Statement at 1, Bean (Civ. A. N
120 Plain
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as done “because it is a predominately black area.”
ntiffs erred in the definition 
of
umber of minorities in 
the
e possibility that the white residents might 
                                                                   
school district” and a “predominately black city council district.”121  
Thus, they charged that the decision to site the landfill in their 
community w 122
This altered strategy may have reflected the plaintiffs’ response to 
the defendant’s earlier motion in opposition to their certification as a 
class.123  Defendants argued that the plai
 their class because not all residents were black.  The defendants 
distinguished among the class and argued that “not only does the class 
proposed by plaintiffs include a large group of non-whites, of which 
the plaintiffs are not a member, but the plaintiffs actually stand in a 
conflicting position with respect to other members of the class they 
purport to represent.”124  This class conflict was contradicted by 
testimony from two of the plaintiffs’ witnesses who were identified as 
being white.  One, a long term resident of the community, argued that 
the siting permit was granted only after the n
 neighborhood had increased.125  The witness’ testimony can be 
understood in terms of the distinction between present and future 
identity and the rates at which “tipping” or racial composition 
changes.126
Further, defendants argued that black plaintiffs “would clearly not 
be in a position to fairly and adequately represent the interests of non-
black members of the proposed class.”127
Even if no actual racial conflict between white and black members 
of the community existed, defendants argued that there was still a 
logical impossibility that challenged the identification of a cohesive 
class.  They claimed that “white resident members of the purported 
class could not possibly have been discriminated against on the basis 
of being blacks.”128  Th
 
121 Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Certification Motion at 1-2, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-
22
laintiffs’ Motion for 
Ce  the Class at 7, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
15). 
122 Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Certification Motion at 6, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
123 Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Certification of the Class at 6, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
124 Id.  
125 Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 10-11, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
126 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Community Pluralism and the “Tipping Point,” in MASS 
MEDIA, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 159-81 (David Demers & K. Viswanath 
eds., 1999). 
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 was not 
co
nts of Census 
Tr
nic.  The complaint noted that the proportion of African-
Am
have been victimized because they lived among blacks
nsidered, even though that argument had been made in a related 
matter by plaintiffs before a Georgia court.129
In 1984, the district court settled the issue of racial identity in this 
particular case by certifying the plaintiffs as a class consisting of all 
of the black residents of the Northwood Manor Division at the time 
the siting permit was granted.130  By 1980, this neighborhood had 
undergone a remarkable shift in its racial composition.  In 1970, 
African-Americans were approximately 30% of the population.  Ten 
years later, the African-American population exceeded 82%.131  The 
court held that although the permit to operate the landfill was not 
approved until the community had become predominantly black, the 
defendants had recommended siting the landfill within the community 
when it was still predominantly white.132  Thus, racial animus on the 
part of the agency could not have been a determining factor in the 
defendants’ decisions.133
2.  Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 
President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12,898 was explicit in 
defining the scope of environmental justice concerns to include 
minority and low income populations.134  The reside
act 4056 in the City of Chester, Pennsylvania were identified as an 
“environmental justice community” because of the preponderance of 
African-Americans (more than 70%) among the group.135
The plaintiffs in this case included eighteen named individuals.  
They were explicitly identified by race or ethnicity, but without 
reference to their economic status.  Of the eighteen, twelve were 
identified as African-American, four were identified as white, and 
two as Hispa
ericans (66.7%) was similar to the proportion of African-
                                                                    
129 See Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (discussing 
a claim by a white woman living in a predominately black neighborhood who argued that 
she was a victim of discrimination because of the rating assigned to her community). 
130 Memorandum and Order at 2, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
der 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2000). 
 Civ. A. 
N
131 Id. at 3. 
132 Id. at 8. 
133 Id.  
134 Exec. Or
135 Complaint at 2-3, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif,
o. 96-CV-3960 (1996). 
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int
ecisions.   Defendants also made few 
ac
hey argued that it was the “so-called race-
neutral” program that was “in fact an intentionally discriminative 
e 
osition of the communities being granted permits was the 
me
site” of the proposed plant.
                                                
Americans in the City of Chester (65.2%).136  Census Tract 4056 had 
a somewhat larger proportion of African-Americans (73.9%).137  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection failed to ensure that a racially discriminatory burden of 
noxious waste would not be placed upon African-American 
communities while white communities enjoyed the benefits of its 
removal.  This was a claim of disparate impact rather than a claim of 
entional discrimination motivated by racial animus. 
The defendants in the case argued that they had, consistent with 
constitutional and statutory provisions, pursued a policy of racial 
neutrality in their permitting d 138
knowledgments of the racial, ethnic, or class character of the 
Chester community.  In their motion to dismiss, the defendants 
suggested that the responsible governmental actor for the distribution 
of noxious facilities would be the “duly elected officials of the City of 
Chester.”139
In their subsequent brief, plaintiffs attempted to meet the 
evidentiary requirements for demonstrating both disparate impact and 
discriminatory intent.  T
program. . . .”140  They argued that the failure to take into account th
racial comp
chanism through which those communities would be assured a 
continuing discriminatory impact.  The plaintiffs believed such an 
outcome was especially likely because ignoring a community’s racial 
composition made it impossible to see the ways in which the 
distribution of noxious facilities exemplified a racially-biased system. 
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection 
Agency submitted an amicus curiae brief141 supporting the plaintiffs 
that emphasized the “heavily minority community surrounding the 
142
                    
. at 9. 
s’ Brief at 3-4, 12, Chester Residents (Civ. A. No. 96-CV-3960). 
A. No. 96-CV-3960). 
uriae United States at 16, Chester Residents (Civ. A. No. 96-CV-
39
 
136 Id. at 7. 
137 Id
138 Defendant
139 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 12, Chester Residents (Civ. 
140 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Dismissal at 9, Chester Residents (Civ. A. No. 96-
CV-3960). 
141 Brief of Amici C
60). 
142 Id. at 16.
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e City of 
Ch
prior cases, plaintiffs charged that a 
go
borhood.”149  
The state’s siting policy allegedly “disproportionately site[ed] 
garbage transfer facilitie mmunities” because the 
sit
 
Judge Dalzell referred to the plaintiffs as members of the “African-
American community in Chester” in his memorandum denying them 
a private right of action.143  The Third Circuit referred to th
ester as a “predominantly black community” in its decision.144  
Thus, this racial definition of the community assisted in establishing a 
private right of action under Title VI.  The court used the same 
rationale as that applied with Title IX that established a similar right 
with reference to sex.145
3.  South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority 
The South Bronx Clean Air Coalition did not identify its members 
by race or ethnicity in its formal complaint.  However, the New York 
City Environmental Justice Alliance, a party to the complaint, 
identified itself as an advocate for the interests of low-income 
neighborhoods and communities of color.146  The complaint 
identified the plaintiffs as residents of the affected neighborhoods, 
and noted that most of these residents “are members of minority 
groups.”147  Similar to 
vernment policy sited “obnoxious environmental activity in 
minority neighborhoods” and tended to “exclude such activities from 
neighborhoods occupied by white residents of the State.”148
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs provided an example of 
an agreement that in effect barred “garbage haulage by rail in 
predominantly white neighborhoods and focus[ed] all garbage 
transfer activity in the South Bronx, a minority neigh
s in non-white co
es were barred from white neighborhoods.150
                                                                    
143 Memorandum at 3, Chester Residents (Civ. A. No. 96-3960). 
144 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 (3d. Cir. 
1997). 
t 934 n.12. 




146 Complaint at 3, South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metro. Transp
04) (AGS). 
147 Id. at 7. 
148 Id. 
149 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 12, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404)
150 Id. at 16. 
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ter detail about the racial and ethnic composition of the 
neighborhoods.  In one affidavit, a neighborhood identified as the 
 as the Melrose 
Co
mparisons between the aggrieved 
So
o thwood Manor 
Ad
                            
Affidavits submitted in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss 
provided grea
“Melrose section of the South Bronx,” also known
mmons Urban Renewal Area, was said to be one of the poorest 
neighborhoods in the United States.  The population was reported to 
be 98% Hispanic and African-American.151  This community 
reportedly organized in order to ensure its survival after having been 
“slated for annihilation.”152
A resident of a community known as Lower Washington Heights 
cited Census data in support of his claim that 79% of the people in his 
area, also known as Community District 12, were Hispanic and 
African-American.153  Finally, co
uth Bronx community and the community that had been spared 
revealed that “the South Bronx [was] poor and minority, while much 
of Long Island [was] mostly middle class and white.”154
B.  Place Matters 
The identification of a community with a particular place is 
critically important to the pursuit of that community’s common 
interests.  These spaces are defined in physical, geographic, political, 
historic, and cultural terms.  The race, class, and health status of its 
residents are the basis for comparisons with the people who live in 
other places. 
1.  Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. 
In their initial complaint, plaintiffs identified the members of the 
class as “present and future residential property owners in the area 
generally referred to, but not limited to, as the N r
dition in the City of Houston and Harris County, Texas.”155  In 
addition, the community included eight Census Tracts, and the 
geographic area bounded by specific bodies of water, roads, and 
railroad tracks.156  The complaint also indicated that the solid waste 
                                        




. H-79-2215 (1979). 
Id. at 1. 
153 Affidavit from John Culpepper at 1, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
154 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Cross Motions to Dismiss at 5,
onx (98 Civ. 4404). 
155 Complaint at 3, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., Civ. A. No
156 Id. 
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recognized residential subdivision might not constitute a 
neighborhood if Bullard’s criteria were followed.  However, the court 
                                                                   
 
atment plant would be sited within the community’s borders by 
specifying its geographic location. 
The defendants made explicit reference to the community’s 
boundaries in calling attention to the fact that “people of various 
racial and ethnic backgrounds . . . live within the geographic 
boundaries of the class alleged by the plaintiffs.”157
The plaintiffs’ post-trial brief referenced other geopolitical 
boundaries in order to emphasize the status of Houston as a “highly 
segregated city,” especially in relation to African-Americans.  The 
plaintiffs also identified the North Forest Independent School District, 
and a newly created city council district as closely
boundaries of the community.  The boundaries were described 
means other than zoning because zoning does not exist in H
Plaintiffs called attention to the limitations on appropriate 
identification that reliance on census tracts represents.  While two 
treatment plants were sited in tracts that had a majority of white 
residents, those plants were actually located in sections of those tracts 
whose residents were primarily African-American.159
In the plaintiffs’ amended class certification motion, only a single 
census tract is mentioned, but a smaller portion, a block group, is 
identified.  The Northwood Manor community boundaries are said to 
conform generally to the boundaries of a specific subpart of that block
oup (224.03).160
The court made the conflict over the definition of neighborhoods 
explicit in 1985.161  Dr. Robert Bullard was the plaintiffs’ primary 
expert witness.  Bullard reportedly changed his definition of 
community to specific neighborhoods rather than census tracts.  
According to Bullard, neighborhoods should be defined in part by a 
“recognized geographic location,” and the residents and others must 
consider it as part of a single community.  Thus, a formally 
 
tion to Dismiss at 3, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
dum and Order at 6, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
157 Defendants’ Mo
158 Plaintiffs’ Post-trial Brief at 6, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
159 Id. at 8. 
160 Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Certification Motion at 2, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
161 Memoran
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 tracts in its comparative analysis.
case, the plaintiffs identified their community as falling 
wi
tion of the rest of Delaware County was a means of 
un
 these applications remained 
with the defendants, without regard to the existence of local zoning 
codes.166  The PADEP is a recipient of federal funds and is expected 
to 
Transportation 
                                                                   
found Bullard’s definitions subjective,162 preferring to rely instead 
upon census 163
2.  Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 
In this 
thin a specific census tract (4056) in which African-Americans 
represented the majority of its residents (73.9%).  Plaintiffs were also 
defined by residing within a one-half, or a one-mile radius of waste 
facilities within Tract 4056.164  Because geographic identification 
moves outward in jurisdictional terms, the City of Chester and nearby 
Chester Township were in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.  The 
racial composi
derscoring the extent to which racial identity is spatially bound. 
Defendants emphasized that the identity of the community fell 
within the jurisdiction of the local municipality and that the Chester 
City Council had adopted the zoning ordinances that governed the 
distribution of waste facilities within the city.165  However, plaintiffs 
consistently argued that the right to deny
comply with federal policies regarding environmental justice, thus 
establishing a jurisdictional scope larger than that of the Chester City 
Council.167
3.  South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metropolitan 
Authority 
Although references to the community in this case are most often 
limited to the “South Bronx,” plaintiffs defined the community 
geographically as bound by 155th and 179th Streets at the north and 
south, and the Hudson River and the East River to the west and 
 
162 Id. at 7. 
163
iv. A. 96-Civ-3960) 
(o
Id. at 18, n.10. 
164 Complaint at 10, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, Civ. A. 
96-Civ-3960 (1996). 
165 Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 17, Chester Residents (Civ. A. 
96-Civ-3960). 
166 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 19, Chester 
Residents (Civ. A. 96-Civ-3960). 
167 Brief of Amici Curiae United States at 19, Chester Residents (C
pposing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss). 
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east.168  Plaintiffs also make reference to areas of “northern 
Manhattan” as a nearby area likely to be affecte
fendants.169
Streets that run through the South Bronx community were 
identified by name and linked with the environmental harms and 
safety risks that industrial traffic represents.170  Sites where the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed air quality monitors 
to gather data on pollution levels within the community were also 
identified by name and street address.171
C.  The Difference Between Us and Them 
A successful claim of discrimination or disparate impact depends 
upon clear and compelling evidence of differential exposure to harm, 
risk, or insult to communities defined by their racial composition. 
1.  Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. 
Initially, the plaintiffs did not allege themselves as members of a 
particular race class.  Rather, they alleged discrimination based on 
specified rights “as enjoyed by white citizens.”172  The operational 
definition of the class was not initially limited to considerations of 
race.  Considerations of “class and socioeconomic factors” were also 
identified as having influenced the decision to grant a permit to 
Southwestern Management Corporation (SMC). 
By pursuing relief through class action, however, plaintiffs were 
compelled to assert that there was “no conflict as between any 
individual named plaintiff and other members of the class.”173  The 
plaintiffs identified the class as consisting of “all past, present and 
future residential property owners in the area.”  This specification 
made no reference to the race or class status of those persons.  This 
claim of solidarity was challenged  by defendants on the basis of 
essentialist assumptions about the racial basis of interests in the 
 
168 South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 20 F. Supp. 2d 565, 573 
(S 8). 
998). 
f John Culpepper at 2, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
.D. N.Y. 199
169 Complaint at 5, South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 98 Civ. 
4404 (1
170 Affidavit of Yolanda Garcia at 2, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
171 Affidavit o
172 Complaint at 1, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., Civ. A. H-79-2215 (1979). 
173 Id. at 3. 
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presence of noxious facilities was likely to 
mu
members of a racial group, as the basis for their status as a class in 
   
 
mmunity and the motivations behind corporate and government 
actions.174
However, white residents of a community that had been 
discriminated against because of its mostly black residents, may have 
sought the very same relief and recognized a common sense of 
oppression and victimization by a racist act.  Members of this 
community organized to oppose a government decision that they 
believed to be part of an historically racist tradition. 
Upon learning about the impending landfill many of the residents 
of Northwood Manor Addition immediately organized to protest the 
landfill so close to their property and within 1700 feet of one of their 
high schools.  Strongly convinced that their area had been selected for 
the site because it is predominantly minority, they circulated petitions, 
picketed the site and the offices of BFI, and raised funds to take legal 
action to prevent the opening of the site.175
Plaintiffs made reference to the neighborhood as a common good, 
claiming that they “stand to lose their neighborhood” as well as “their 
childrens’ safety and self-esteem.”176  The injury that the residents 
sought to avoid included the losses associated with the stigma of 
becoming a poor black community.  Once this mark was made, the 
stigma associated with the 
ltiply and accelerate the losses.177
Despite this basis for solidarity, plaintiffs occasionally wavered in 
defining their class and its common minority status.178  The plaintiffs 
emphasized the common status of residents as victims, rather than as 
                                                                 
174 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Original Answer at 3, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-
2215). 
175 Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 2, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
176 Id. at 19. 
177 See generally Robin Gregory et al., Risk Perceptions, Stigma, and Health Policy, 2 
HEALTH & PLACE 213, 213, 217 (1996) (discussing the ways in which places become 
stigmatized through association with a blemish or taint). 
178 The Statement of Facts identifies plaintiffs as “minority residential homeowners.”  
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 1, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215).  The plaintiffs’ 
Second Amended Complaint, filed two days later (November 29, 1979) continued to use 
th re comprehensive identification of the class.  However, in the plaintiffs’ 
Po
e earlier, mo
st-Trial Brief (December 10, 1979), the class seeking relief was again identified as “a 
group of minority homeowners.”  Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 1, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-
2215). 
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 should have been disqualified on that basis.  The 
defendants suggested that common status as minorities was not 
up of non-
wh
1981.179  Defendants contended that the class was not racially 
homogenous and
sufficient because the proposed class included “a large gro
ites, of which plaintiffs [were] not . . . member[s].”  Further, 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs (presumably black) “actually 
stand in a conflicting position with respect to other members of the 
class they purport to represent.”180  The possibility of group solidarity 
was further denied by defendants in their assertion that “black 
plaintiffs . . . would clearly not be in a position to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of non-black members of the 
proposed class.”181  While “white resident members of the purported 
class could not possibly have been discriminated against on the basis 
of being blacks,” they certainly could feel solidarity because of their 
common loss by virtue of their common status as residents of a 
community in which the majority of the residents are African-
American.182
Their basis for certification as a class for the purpose of the suit 
was that they had been discriminated against “because they live in a 
predominantly [b]lack area” not because they were necessarily black 
themselves.  However, despite the efforts of the plaintiffs to define 
this class more broadly, the court ultimately certified a racially-
defined class.183
2.  Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif 
By 1996, following the lead established in President Clinton’s 
Executive Order (12,898) and the subsequent draft environmental 
justice strategy issued by the EPA, identifying Chester residents as 
low income and minority residents who were concerned about the 
health effects that may result from being surrounded by waste 
                                                                    
179 Plaintiffs’ Notice and Motion to Maintain a Class Action at 7, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-
79-2215). 
180 Defendant’s Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Certification of the Class at 6, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
um and Order at 2, Bean (Civ. A. No. H-79-2215) (noting the decision 
m 984). 
181 Id. at 7. 
182 Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1028 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (plaintiff 
argued that she had standing to complain of racial discrimination because even though she 
was white, she was adversely affected by the fact that she lived in a predominantly non-
white zip code). 
183 Memorand
ade on July 9, 1
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discrimination against African-Americans.   
Th
expectancy, age-adjusted cancer mortality, infant 
mo
  This inequity means that less powerful communities bear 
mo
aspect of their identity.  It was color, rather than class, that could be 
the basis of their identity as a protected class.  Yet, the failure of the 
                                        
 
treatment facilities, the plaintiffs still characterized the offense they 
suffered in terms of 184
e named plaintiffs were explicitly identified as African-American, 
Hispanic and white.  Although they shared a common residence in the 
City of Chester, in and around Census Tract 4056, they were not 
identified as representatives of a class. 
Plaintiffs sought to compare Census Tract 4056 with other 
jurisdictions in terms of their population, racial composition, and 
environmental burden.  The plaintiffs noted, for example, that the 
“land area concentration of waste facilities in Census Tract No. 
4056 . . . is 286 times as great as the land area concentration in 
Delaware County outside the City of Chester/Chester Township 
area.”185  Comparisons of the City of Chester with Delaware County 
in terms of the life 
rtality, and rates of low birth weight babies also served to 
characterize this community as one that was burdened by ill health.186
Residents of the City of Chester share a number of commonalities 
with other low-income, minority communities.  These commonalities 
include an inability to oppose the siting of waste facilities with the 
same success enjoyed by “[c]ommunities of wealth and political 
power.”187
re of the burden of waste facilities, while other communities reap 
the benefits.  Plaintiffs noted that those who derive the benefits are 
primarily white, while those who bear the burdens are primarily 
African-American.188
Even though residents of Census Tract 4056 were not all African-
American, plaintiffs argued that a discriminatory effect still resulted 
“because a majority of the residents are African Americans.”189  
Thus, while the complaint appeared to identify the residents in terms 
of their special status as a community that is poor, it was their status 
as a community of color that was required to serve as the primary 
                            
184 Complaint at 36, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, Civ A. 
No. 96-CV-3960 (1996). 
185 Id. at 18. 
186 Id. at 22. 
187 Id. at 30. 
188 Id. at 32. 
189 Id. at 34. 
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EPA and its newly created Office of Environmental Justice.
                                                                   
 
permitting agency to take this attribute of their identity into account 
was the basis of their defense.  Indeed, the defendants argued that 
taking race into account in a decision to permit would be 
unconstitutional.190
However, a concern about the due caution reserved for matters 
involving race should not extend to considering the cum
impact of past decisions regarding the placement of waste treatment 
facilities in communities.  A “standard of equivalent responsibilities
that define
nsider other attributes of those communities, such as race or 
class.191
Plaintiffs argued that PADEP knew, or should have known, that 
this community had been assigned a massively disproportionate 
burden of waste treatment facilities.192  No consideration of race 
would have been required for them to respond with concern.  The 
community’s identity could have been defined in terms of its history 
of abuse without regard to its race or socioeconomic class.  
uired by Title VI, this abuse did not need to have been assessed in 
racially-comparative terms.  The disparity in “land areas 
concentration” of waste treatment facilities between Chester 
Township and the rest of Delaware County should have been hard for 
an environmental protection agency to ignore if a standard of 
distributive justice was in place.  The fact that community residents 
often angrily reminded the department of this fact was also noted by 
the plaintiffs.193  Indeed, the historically poor environmental status of 
Chester had earned the community a special place of honor within the 
194
 
190 of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 13, Chester Residents (Civ. A. 
No 0). 
 3 office in Chester were described as one of the model projects that were 
designed in response to Clinton’s  
fin ences that made 
Ch
Brief in Support 
. 96-CV-396
191 We note the case of rural communities in western New York State that struggled 
against being assigned what they felt was an unfair burden in relation to the large urban 
centers that generated much of the waste.  See Gary Abraham, Concepts of Community in 
Environmental Disputes: Farmersville and Western New York’s Garbage Wars, 7 BUFF. 
ENVTL L.J. 51, 105 (2000). 
192 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, Chester 
Residents (Civ. A. No. 96-CV-3960). 
193 Id. at 8. 
194 Chester, Pennsylvania was the poster child of the environmental justice movement.  
In the Environmental Justice Strategy issued by the EPA in April of 1995, the activities of 
the EP nA Regio
Executive Order (12,898).  It is in this document that we
d a detailed description of the environmental burden and health consequ
ester a candidate for special attention.  See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
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mmunity described the death of her 27 




                                                                                                                                                
3.  South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority 
The plaintiffs in the South Bronx identified themselves as people 
who “live and are attempting to raise children” in the areas affected 
by decisions of the transportation agency.195  The poor health status 
of the residents in this community is presented as a central feature of 
its identity.  The areas affected by the MTA’s policies were described 
as having “the highest rates of respiratory disease in the nation,” and 
according to plaintiffs, “the death rate for asthma in these 
neighborhoods is up to eight times the national average.”196
In the amended complaint, plaintiffs provided greater detail about 
the health status of the community surrounding the Harlem River 
Yard.  The areas that would be affected by the challenged decisions 
were said to “have the highest rates of hospitalization, disability and 
death attributable to respiratory disease in the nation.”197  These 
statistical claims were provided with a human face as one Hispanic 
resident of the Melrose co
by a
  Beyond injuries attributed to pollution, the plaintiffs also 
rovided examples of other health related consequences from the
uting of trucks through residential neighborhoods.199
Plaintiffs associated themselves with numerous other minority 
neighborhoods in New York state, which they suggested have been 
forced to bear similar burdens, while white communities in the state 
have been sheltered.200  The sense of linked fate that supports the 
development of a common identity among the victims of land use 
policies is also described in terms of these communities’ limited 
economic and political resources.  A presumed inability to “go it 





 in Hunts 
Po
int at 20, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
E EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY 18 (1995), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ej/ej_strategy_1995.pdf (
pt. 24, 2004). 
195 Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 2, South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Metro. Transp. Auth. 
(98 Civ. 4404). 
196 Id. at 4. 
197 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 10, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
198 Affidavit of Yolanda Garcia in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint at 2, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
199 In her affidavit, Yolanda Garcia cited a recent case of a young woman
int who was killed by a large truck passing through the neighborhood.  Id. 
200 Plaintiffs’ Amended Compla
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a region 
characterized as being “mostly middle class and white,”203 that has 
been spared the types of en arms that would ordinarily 
ac
 own terms and characteristic styles.  While 
the
 
environmental justice groups, such as the New York City 
Environmental Justice Alliance,201 in the hope of preserving their 
communities.202  A comparison is made with Long Island, 
vironmental h
company the use of the Long Island Railroad to transport garbage 
through their communities. 
IV 
THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ABOUT IDENTITY AND RISK 
Communities came together in opposition to the corporate boards 
and the administrative agencies that appeared to have combined 
forces against them.  These communities would have preferred to 
state their claims in their
y could make use of a broad range of rhetorical tools in an effort to 
win public opinion,204 they faced considerable constraints in their 
formal submissions to the court.  They have had to learn, and at least 
appear to adopt, a set of modernist assumptions regarding the benefits 
of science, reason, and rationality.205  While this was more familiar 
ground for the managers of waste, the judges were also reluctant to 
adopt an unfamiliar set of tools for the finding of facts and the 
recognition of wisdom in the discourse of probable cause.206
A.  Standing 
A central concern in each of these three cases is the need for 
plaintiffs to achieve legal standing in order to place a claim before the 
court.  In each case, a debate continued regarding the extent to which 
there was a private right of action to challenge the decisions of 
                                                                    
201 NYCEJA is identified as a “city-wide umbrella organization of community based 
organizations that are actively engaged in environmental work in low-income communities 
of color,” that included efforts to “secure compliance with Executive Order 12,898.”  At 
the time, eight of their fifteen member organizations were based in the South Bronx and 
Northern Manhattan.  Affidavit of Leslie H. Lowe in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Complaint at 2-3, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
202 Affidavit of Yolanda Garcia at 3-4, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
203 Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law at 5, South Bronx (98 Civ. 4404). 
204 Binder, supra note 23, at 1. 
ju
205 Welcomer, supra note 99, at 1175 (discussing this conflict and constraint). 
206 Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of 
Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1109 (1999) (discussing 
dges’ possible use of a probabilistic approach as suggested in EPA proposed guidelines). 
 




elf-esteem, are especially salient in the 
de
ting to demonstrate that 
all
endants had a strategic interest, 
wh
status of racial minorities,  but in all other motions, they resisted 
m
administrative agencies.  The fact that the basis for the claims are 
related to the guarantee of civil rights and equal treatment under the 
law has meant that a massive body of case law and judicia
erpretation may be called upon by all parties in an effort to 
advocate their positions. 
In each case, plaintiffs claimed standing on the basis of harms that 
they suffered or expected to suffer as a result of the actions of 
defendants.  These harms were identified as harms to person and 
property, as well as to the community itself and included financial, 
physical, and psychological harms.  Claims regarding emotional 
harms, including threats to s
velopment of claims about discrimination.  Disparity in the 
distribution of goods, including respect, are understandable in terms 
of the loss of self-esteem.207
Only one of the cases in this Article actively pursued certification 
as a class.  The benefits of class certification must be weighed against 
the burdens of proof and the risks of failure.  In the Bean case, the 
efforts of the plaintiffs to win certification as a class provides 
powerful insight into one of the ways in which the requirements of the 
court shape the identification of the community and its social 
movement.  Plaintiffs met little difficulty in demonstrating that the 
class was large, and that the pursuit of class interests would be more 
efficient than having plaintiffs pursue their individual interests.  The 
plaintiffs encountered more difficulty attemp
 of the relevant concerns would be the same for all members of the 
class.  Pursuit of a class action implied that individual differences and 
distinctions were insignificant.  Def
ich they pursued vigorously, to demonstrate that there would be 
important differences that could be assumed to exist as a result of 
fundamental incompatibilities that existed within the proposed class. 
The plaintiffs in Bean waivered in the way by which they 
announced their common identity.  At one point, they adopted the 
208
aking such a claim.  Instead, they consistently defined themselves 
and their class as being composed of residential property owners.  
                                                                    
207 Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1025-26 (1995). 
208 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Resistance to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 
1, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., Civ. A. No. H-79-2215 (1979) (identifying 
plaintiffs as “minority residential homeowners”), and Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 1, Bean 
(Civ. A. No. H-79-2215). 
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rican-Americans to take.  
Re
assert a claim of interest.  Such a claim can be based on an 
   
 
Perhaps the plaintiffs felt that the relationship between the ownership 
of land and the rights of citizens in the United States had been too 
closely tied to be ignored.209
Residential property ownership is a critical first step, and one that 
has been particularly difficult for Af
alization of the economic, social, and political benefits of 
residential property ownership is more difficult and unlikely due to 
environmental racism.  The values placed at risk when communities 
are threatened by the siting of obnoxious or hazardous facilities 
extend far beyond the market prices of residential properties.  
According to one observer, “landownership has had multiplier effects 
for the African-American community.  These positive benefits 
include evidence of increased levels of political participation, 
education, and psychological well-being.”210  The special importance 
of property to African-Americans was a point that might have been 
made by plaintiffs in Bean, but was ignored. 
However, courts have not recognized the value of community to 
the extent that its survival would be treated as equal to, or even 
superior to, other economic goals.211
Additional challenges facing plaintiffs are not fully examined here.  
These challenges include decisions which indicate that courts actually 
have recognized a collective interest in the character of a community.  
Prior to the passage of civil rights laws that elevated the value of 
competing state interests, restrictions designed to protect a white 
community from the disruptive impact of “invasions”212 of African-
Americans had been treated as legitimate by administrative agencies.  
When community activists now seek to protect African-American 
communities from the destructive impact of waste treatment facilities, 
their efforts have been far less successful. 
Of course, ownership of property is not necessary for individuals to 
                                                                 
209 Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 87 (1998). 
210 Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black 
La artition Sales of 
Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 532 (2001). 
ndownership, Political Independence, and Community Through P
211 Id. at 553. 
212 This terminology was commonly used by sociologists concerned with the “human 
ecology” of neighborhoods.  Racial and ethnic change in urban neighborhoods were 
discussed in terms of invasion and succession.  See NOEL P. GIST & L. A. HALBERT, 
URBAN SOCIETY 170-71, 185-86 (1956). 
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nd the loss of community that would result if individuals 
we
ibility for any of the adverse health effects 
claimed by plaintiffs because particular emissions were within 
establis , have 
arg
individual’s use of that property.  Margaret Jane Radin considers the 
case of a tenant organization that seeks the establishment or 
maintenance of rent control in order to avoid the dispersion of its 
members, a
re forced to leave the community in search of affordable 
housing.213  Radin suggests that in such cases, “real community (in 
the spiritual sense) may be preserved even at some expense of 
fungible property interests of others, at least where the group affirms 
through local political action[,] like rent control[,] that it seeks 
continuity.”214  Of particular importance in these cases is the claim 
that these harms are the result of intentional and direct, as well as 
unintentional and indirect, actions on the part of defendants. 
Additionally, many alleged harms include the cumulative impact 
on residents of low income communities.  Defendants have argued 
that they bear no respons
hed standards.  However, courts, and recently the EPA
ued that the cumulative impact of emissions and other pernicious 
externalities experienced over time ought to be considered in the 
context of “environmental justice communities.”215  Plaintiffs invite 
consideration of parallels in the mythical tale of the “last straw that 
broke the camel’s back,” which in their view effectively weighed far 
more than any of those that went before.  Questions regarding the 
relative weight or consequences of additional facilities are not matters 
that ordinary citizens can answer for themselves.  The EPA and the 
courts seem then bound to rely upon the expertise of the permitting 
agency.216
                                                                    
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS 4 (Feb. 4, 1998) (making 
reference to investigations of disp
213 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 87 (1993). 
214 Id. 
215 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI 
arate impacts, and suggesting that “OCR will conduct a 
factual investigation to determine whether the permit(s) at issue will create a disparate 
impact, or add to an existing disparate impact, on a racial or ethnic population”). 
216 In rejecting an appeal for administrative review of a decision by its Region V office, 
the EPA Review Board ignored references to “stigma” as a discriminatory effect, and 
agreed with the regional office that “[s]ince all of the existing facilities have the potential 
for visible emissions, noise, and odors, the existing facilities will likely have a greater 
effect on property values than the EDS facility.”  Environmental Disposal Sys., Inc., 98-1 
& 98-2 Envtl. App. Bd. 35-36 (Oct. 15, 1998). 
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  Defendants in Chester 
Re




of community may eventually rise to a level of 
fu
 the social meaning of community. 
ortionately visited upon poor and minority communities the 
weight of the harms should have been multiplied before the courts.  
Under the assumptions of a civil rights regime, an adverse impact, 
                                                                   
 
In Chester, Pennsylvania, the well-being of the natural 
environment itself is treated as being of greater importance than the 
health status of the humans who live within it.
sidents referred to statutory guidelines that were designed to 
protect perennial streams to support the claim that the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) was “authorized 
to review the location only to insure that the facility [would] not 
violate the environmental rules and regulations.”217  No statutory 
regulation in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was cited that had 
been designed to protect the humans who were perennial victims of 
environmental disregard. 
B.  The Nature and Distribution of Hazard and Risk 
Significant arguments and
ncern specifying the nature and extent of alleged harms.  Plaintiff
ay seek special attention from the courts on the basis of membership
a protected class, identified by race or national origin, and on the 
basis of the risk posed to particular valuables considered fundamental, 
therefore entitling a higher level of judicial scrutiny.  This Article 
asserts that there is a substantial state interest in ensuring that people 
have a place to live and that home ownership is a fundamental right of 
American citizens.  The pursuit of anti-discrimination goals in 
housing policy, including non-discriminatory access to mortgages and 
financial services, as well as land use policy, is indicative of that 
general assertion.218
The loss 
ndamental necessity, but the response by the courts involved in the 
environmental justice cases does not reflect any movement in that 
direction.  A historical preservation movement, like environmental 
conservation more generally, is concerned more about the material, 
rather than
In each of the cases reviewed above, plaintiffs charged that the 
harms were problematic on their face, but because they were 
disprop
 
Living v. Seif, Civ. A. No. 96-3960 (1996). 
217 Defendants’ Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief at 6-7, Chester Residents Concerned for 
Quality 
218 Mitchell, supra note 210, at 505. 
 
190        J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION  [Vol. 19(1), 2004] 
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Dem us was 
a 
itioners who are making 
civil rights claims.  The courts are faced with the problem of 
as
, and disregard composing the 
“b
 
qually distributed, invites an attent
pecially if these disparities break down along the color line.  
Because the evidentiary burden of demonstrating disparate impact in 
South Bronx had not been met by plaintiffs, the question of whether 
or not they had sufficient standing to pursue a claim under Section 
602 of Title VI was irrelevant.219
C.  The Identification of Reference or Comparison Communities 
Disparate impact requires a reliable basis for comparing the 
burdens being imposed upon a protected community with the 
experiences of an equivalent community that differs only by race, 
ethnicity, or a limited set of other distinctions to warrant strict judicial 
scrutiny.  Assumptions regarding the functional equivalence of spatial 
and political aggregations such as census tracts and zip codes are 
easily and often challenged.  For example, despite the fact that two 
census tracts may have the sa
idents, their distribution within those tracts may differ quite 
dramatically. 
In Bean, the community of Whispering Pines went from being a 
majority of white citizens to a black majority in less than ten years.220  
Comparisons made at different points in time can err in the 
identification of a community or in assessing the harms to which it i
onstrating the equivalence of communities ceteris parib
burden beyond the ability of the plaintiffs in each case examined 
above. 
D.  Proof Versus Statistical Inference 
The development of an evidentiary standard based on statistical 
comparisons also seems likely to burden pet
signing weight and value to intangibles, like the injuries to the spirit 
that accompany insults, disrespect
lack tax” of everyday racism.221
                                                                    
219 South Bronx Clean Air Coalition v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (S.D. N.Y. 
1998). 
220 Memorandum and Order at 2-3, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt., Civ. A. No. H-
79
SONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS 
OF 
-2215 (Feb. 1985). 
221 JODY D. ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REA
BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 115-18 (1997). 
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The courts seem incapable of establishing a consistent basis for 
assigning responsibility.  The probative weight of statistical 
significance adds uncertainty to the process.  First, the problem of 
establishing causation by statistical means remains difficult.222  Next, 
the causal requirements of the courts vary with the claims and charges 
being made.223  As a result, the advice provided by experts often 
conflicts, can be confusing, and is not readily understood by 
courts.224  The evidentiary standards are especially problematic when 
the charge is discrimination.225
Evidence that demonstrates by statistical means a strong 
association between race and exposure to environmental hazards 
cannot prove that race was taken into account in the administrative 
decisions.  However, a statistically significant correlation may 
convince the court that a significant disparity bears the scar of racism, 
even if the individual decisions that produced it are free of its scent. 
Actual Versus Potential Harm or Adverse Impa
Plaintiffs also struggle to demonstrate that the siting of a treatment 
plant, or other insult to the environment, extends harm to the 
surrounding community and its residents.  First, plaintiffs are in a 
markedly weakened position when they have to appeal for relief from 
harms that might come in the future.  It is far easier to seek relief from 
a present condition that is likely to continue. 
A retroactive assessment of the correlation between the
mposition of zip codes and the presence of pollution-generating 
facilities within them can convince a sympathe
ciation is especially strong.226  A prospective assessment 
                                                            
222 , in 
CAU
KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 337-39 (Vaughn R. McKim & Stephen R. Turner 
eds., 1997). 
223 See generally STATISTICS AND THE LAW (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds., 1994). 
224 Beecher-Monas, supra note 206, at 1047 (discussing the problems that judges face 
in
ents and the number of facilities in 
a 
See Larry V. Hedges, The Role of Construct Validity in Causal Generalizations
SALITY IN CRISIS:  STATISTICAL METHODS AND THE SEARCH FOR CAUSAL 
 making decisions based on scientific evidence). 
225 See generally DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W. L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF 
DISCRIMINATION (1980). 
226 South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 
2d 446 (D. N.J. 2001).  Plaintiffs’ consultant argued that “the odds that there was no 
relationship between the percentage of non-white resid
ZIP Code area are less than 3 in 10 million.”  Id. at 492.  Judge Stephen Orlofsky 
concluded that the statistical evidence demonstrated a “causal link” between the agencies’ 
permitting practice and a disparate impact.  Id. at 495. 
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esta mmunities and its members 
on an unspecified, but arguably relevant number of dimensions.  
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rovoking one to respond that: 
claims because it is likely that the plaintiff, acting like an attorney 
general, acts ho may have, or would have, 
                                                     
 
siderably more demanding.  This assessment depends up
blishing the equivalence between co
pidemiological studies that reveal a historical association between
 chemicals and an increas
ten introduced in support of plaintiffs’ claims about damage that is 
likely to be done.  Defendants can generally successfully challenge 
the quality of the studies by demonstrating that the statistical models 
are poorly specified or incomplete.227  In many of these analyses the 
so-called “effect” of race is reduced to non-significance when other 
factors that correlate with race are included in the statistical models. 
F.  The Need to Balance Competing Interests 
Environmental justice advocates do not deny the economic
t flow from industrial development, transportation, and waste 
management.  However, advocates argue that the distribution of the 
benefits and the costs is inequitable, and thereby unjust.  Still, it 
seems unlikely and unreasonable to expect plaintiffs representing low 
income or minority communities to argue for relief on the basis of a 
cost/benefit analysis which traditionally ignores distributions. 
The EPA efforts to achieve balance among these interests enraged 
movement activists, p
Inviting such “stakeholders”—the objects of civil rights complaints 
and the industries accused of poisoning communities of color—to 
hammer out civil rights policy would be analogous to convening 
meetings [with] the KKK and segregationist southern governors to 
come up with an “acceptable” civil rights policy in 1960.  The 
product in 2000 [was] no less offensive.228
CONCLUSION:  THE IDENTITY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT IS AT RISK 
Group membership is important in pursuing anti-discrimination 
in the interests of others w
               
mmendations that flow from 
an
227 Warren Kriesel et al., Neighborhood Exposure to Toxic Releases: Are There Racial 
Inequities?, 27 GROWTH & CHANGE 479 (1996) (discussing the importance of model 
specification in shaping the conclusions and policy reco
alyses of toxic releases by Census block groups). 
228 Letter from Luke Cole, supra note 40, at 6. 
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tion of risk.  Clearly, those who are able and inclined to 
rel
rily impose.  It is not clear whether the use of terms of 
ref
ncome persons and populations.  Communities, and 
                                                                   
been victims of some discriminatory act.229  Victims of 
environmental injustice need not be members of the same racial or 
ethnic group in order to suffer from the harms to which their 
community is exposed.  Living within or near communities that have 
a substantial number of low-income and minority group residents 
should be sufficient to place all residents and visitors at risk. 
However, there are distinctions related to problems associated with 
the identifica
y on exit rather than voice to reduce their exposure to risks are 
different from their neighbors.  Those who remain, and identify as a 
member of the community as they pursue interests that arise on the 
basis of membership in that community, produce benefits that are 
enjoyed by other members of the community.  This is a classic 
positive externality. 
The sense of linked fate that raises the salience of group identity 
seems capable of overcoming the barriers that race, class, and gender 
might ordina
erence like “environmental justice community,” will serve to 
reduce the salience of race and ethnicity.  A host of additional forces 
appear to be weakening the power of more essentialist forms of racial 
identity, especially in urban areas.230
A critical question to be pursued is whether the efforts by the 
Clinton Administration to introduce considerations of class or income 
into the discourse of equal rights231 will become the defining feature 
of the environmental justice movement.  A distinction exists between 
the language used in Clinton’s Executive Order 12,898 and the 
memorandum that conveyed the order to the heads of departments and 
agencies.  The memorandum consistently refers to minority and low-
income communities, while the executive order consistently refers to 
minority and low-i
 
229 Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 860 
(2001). 
230 Shirley Brice Heath, Race, Ethnicity, and the Defiance of Categories, in TOWARD A 
COMMON DESTINY 39-70 (Willis Hawley & Anthony Jackson eds., 1995) (describing the 
merging of racial and ethnic identities among urban youth). 
231 Clinton’s Executive Order (12,898) and its accompanying memorandum makes a 
 
CO
distinction between “minority communities” and “low-income communities” and refers to 
them so consistently in this way, that it would appear that he intended to extinguish the 
correlation between the two.  See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY
MP. PRES. DOC. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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the social movements that originate within them, do not exist within 
the order.TPF232FPT 
The number of identifiable groups or populations that have become 
entitled to protections against “simple discrimination,” as well as to 
“reasonable accommodation” have also expanded.TPF233FPT  Although the 
disabled population is poorly defined, court decisions in civil cases 
will solidify this definition by virtue of their membership in those 
groups.  The meaning of group membership is the central issue.  It is 
the very same issue pursued in the attempt to define the 
environmental justice community and the nature of the rights of that 
community. 
A sense of community solidarity may be able to overcome the 
distinctions that race and class have reinforced in the past.  The 
framing of the environmental justice movement in terms of race and 
class is likely to narrow the scope of the movement.  In Bean, a class 
defined as homeowners was as concerned about the loss in property 
values as they were concerned about threats to the health of the 
youngsters who would attend the local high school.  In Chester 
Residents and South Bronx, though health and safety emerged as the 
motivating concerns, the plaintiffs’ status as low-income communities 
seemed more important than their racial or ethnic characteristics.  
Therefore, the equitable distribution of environmental benefits and 
burdens may be well served by adding “economic status” to the list of 
protected groups. 
 
                                                                    
T
232
T See Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2000). 
T
233
T Kelman, supra note 229, at 841, 893. 
